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5
The Summoned Self
Ethics and Hermeneutics in Paul Ricoeur
in Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas
MARK I. WALLACE

Paul Ricoeur's and Emmanuel Levinas's writings are a rich source for scripturally nuanced philosophical reflectio n o n the question of the mandated self
in relation to others. Former colleagues at the University of Paris-Nanterre.
Levinas and Ricoeur have engaged one another in their writings over the
years, making a comparison of their related proposals a potentially fruitful
enterprise. In this essay, I will suggest that Ricoeur, in his sustained contrapuntal dialogue with Levinas. successfull y mediates the dia lectic between
self-esteem and solicitude for o thers in his ethical tho ught. In this vein. I hope
to show ho w both Ricoeur and Levinas use the biblical texts to construe the
project of selfhood in terms of being summo ned-beyond one ·s choosing and
willing-to take responsibility for the neighbor-even at great cost to one self.
For each thinker, the individual becomes a self by allowing the divine Other to
awaken it to its respo nsibilities for the human other. Nevertheless. the nature
of the self being summoned to its responsibilities. o n the one hand, and the
henneneutical method for understanding this summons within the biblical
texts. on the other, are questions answered differently by each theorist. It is the
answers to these questions that finally divide Levinas and Ricoeur from one
another while still providing support for the deep affinities that underlie their
related projects. While privileging Ricoeur·s model of the summoned self in
m y exposition. I conclude with some comments about the aporetics of conscience in Dietrich Bonhoeffer·s life and thought as a challenge to Ricoeur's
analysis of the inner voice in mo ral dec ision-making.

I
Before I begin this conversatio n between Ricoeur and Levinas, let me fust
make some preliminary comments about Ricoeur's identity as a philosopher
who uses the biblical texts to provide imaginary variations on the theme of
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the good life. As a philosopher, Ricoeur is a henneneutical phenomenologist,
to use Don Ihde·s felicitous description of Ricoeur: and as a biblical exegete.
he is an interpreter of the meaning of the Word within the words of the scriptural intertexts. Henneneutical philosophy and biblical interpretation-these
two task s constitute the distinctive, but always related, fulcrums about which
Ricoeur's thought turns. This dual description of Ricoeur's intellectual identity entails three characteristics.
First, as a hermeneut. Ricoeur argues that selfhood begins not with the
philosophical hubris that the subject is an autonomous self but with an
awareness that the subject enters consciousness already formed by the symbolic systems within its culture. Consciousness is never independent or
empty-a tabula rasa-but always already interpenetrated by the founding
symbols and stories that constitute one's communal heritage. Thus the journey to selfhoo<l commences with the exegesis of the imaginary symbols and
stories constitutive of one ·s cultural inheritance in order to equip the subject
to become an integrate<.! self by means of appropriating these symbols and
stories as her own. Second. as a phenomenoloKist, Ricoeur puts into abeyance
any judgment about-in Husserlian terms. he performs an epoche regarding- the reality status of the imaginary claims made by one ·s orienting
textual sources. This bracketing exercise is performed in order to accord to
these claims the status of live<.! possibilities-even if they cannot be established as referring to proven realities in the world. 1 Third, and finally, as a
theo/of?icuf thinker within the biblical traditions-but not as a theologian
per se, a label Ricoeur consistently refuses- Ricoeur maintains that it is in
allowing oneself to be appropriated by the figurative possibilities imagined
by the biblical texts that the task of becoming a full self is most adequately
performed. A person's willingness to become an apprentice to the summoning voice of the text begins the performance of a life well lived in relation to
self and others.
As a philosopher and interpreter of the Bible, it might appear, then, at
least at first glance. that Ricoeur is a philosophical theologian, or perhaps a
philosopher who engages in cryptotheology to promote his philosophical
aims. But these readings of Ricoeur's project are a mistake. Ricoeur is not a
philosophical theologian, if by that phrase one means a religious thinker who
grounds reflections on God and the self on a particular philosophical foundation. By the same token. he is not a Christian philosopher, if by that phrase
one means a philosopher who utilizes philosophical discourse to prove the
truth of Christian faith claims in opposition to other rival claims. Faith, for
Ricoeur, is always a wager and a risk and can never be established as apodictically cenain based on the false security of a philosophical substructure. As
a wager, faith eschews any triumphalism that posits one set of life choices as
inherently superior to another set of choices. The only verification of the
truth of such choices is found, over the course of one·s existence, in the rich
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quality of a life well lived in harmony with self and o thers. No thought system external to these choices can adjudicate which. if any. allernative forms
of life are superior to another.
In this respect, Ricoeur is a thoroughgoing Kantian. as Pamela Sue
Anderson has shown, because like Kant he seeks to resolve the "conflict"
between the "faculties" of theology and philosophy by erecting a rigid partition between the two disciplines: even as philosophy should be conceived as
an autonomous, agnostic field of study that puts in suspension the 4uestion of
God, so also should theology be regarded as a self-contained enterprise that
refuses the temptation to ground its inquiries on a cryptophilosophical foundation.~ ln a Kantian vein, Ricoeur argues that it is productive to cautiously
borrow language and concepts from one domain to elucidate the other mode
of inquiry as long as such borrowing does not degenerate into gmunding or
detemiining the one discipline on the basis of the other. 1 Like Kant. who
bifurcates the interests of critical philosophy and religious inquiry, Ricoeur
defends his rigid partition by arguing that philosophy operates in the registry
of reflective analysis, while theology functions as living testimony to the
possibilities of biblical faith without the pseudosecurity of any metaphysical
foundations.
In another sense, however, the trajectory of Ricoeur's work is not Kantian but Anselmian. Or, to put it another way, Ricoeur. as a scripturally
infonned philosopher, takes his cues from the Kant o f Religio11 wi1hi11 the
Bounds of Reason Alone , where biblical imagery is thoughtfully utilized for
the explication of the moral life. and not the Kant of the three Critiques. If, as
I have suggested above in labeling Ricoeur a hermeneutical thinker. all
thought takes flight within the fullness of one·s symbolically rich and textually mediated presuppositions, then biblical faith. while neither the queen of
philosophy nor its handmaiden, is the generative impulse- but never the
determining ground-for Ricoeur's whole enterprise . Religion. then, is the
rich matrix that motivates and informs Ricoeur's autonomous and agnostic
philosophy of the moral life. Unlike Kant-if one reads Kant diachronically
from the first Critique onward- Ricoeur does not move from a presuppositionless critical philosophy to a regional application of the critical philosophy
to religious questions. On the contrary, he begins all of his various projects in
the fullness of his beliefs, and then strives critically to understand better the
implications of such beliefs through the discipline of philosophical inquiry.
Ricoeur's question. therefore, is not Kant's question in the first Critiq11enamely: How can knowledge be denied in order to make room for faith?
Rather, his question is: In the fullness of faith, how can critical inquiry explicate the meaning of the presumptions and concerns generated by this faith?
Or. as Ricoeur puts it in an earlier context. How can philosophy be pressed
into the service of saturating faith with intelligibility?~ In the introduction to
Oneself as Another. Ricoeur states that his abiding interests in various philo-
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ious philosophical problems-including the overall problem of the self-is
motivated by the ··convictions that bind me to biblical faith ."~ Ricoeur rejects
the quixotic illusion of philosophy-to begin thought without presuppositions- by fully owning his positioned belonging to a rich heritage of biblical
language and imagery as the wellspring of his philosophical itinerary.

II
To this point, 1 have sought to situate Ricoeur·s hermeneutic of selfhood
within the history of Western philosophical and religious thought. Now I
would like to more explicitly take up Ricoeur's hermeneutic vis-a-vis his dialogue with Levinas concerning the dialectic of the self and the other. To
begin this dialogue, let me first turn to an analysis of a central problematic in
Ricoeur's moral philosophy: the question of the "broken cogito" and the role
of conscience in mediating the fundamental discontinuity of the self with
itself. For Ricoeur, the self is permanently "other" to itself because, contrary
to Descartes, the self is not a fixed subject. in full possession of itself, that
perdures over time. But while the self is not an immutable substratum,
according to Ricoeur, it does not follow that there is no self, as some of
Descartes's critics maintain. Some anticogito thinkers (for example, Michel
Foucault) contend that insofar as there is no entitative core self, the subject is
nothing other than the sum total of the discourses practiced by its particular
culture. Similarly, some analytic philosophers (for example, Derek Parfit),
who also criticize Cartesian essentialism, argue that the subject is reducible
(without remainder) to its brain states and bodily functions. Ricoeur rejects
both of these options- historicist and physicalist-through a tripartite analysis of the phenomenon of passivity or alterity within seltho()d.6 My self- as
neither a fixed entity, discursive construct, nor biochemical cipher-<:obbles
together its identity by experiencing the "otherness'' of my own body, the
dissymmetry between myself and the other person in front of me, and,
finally, and most important for my analysis, the originary phenomenon of
being called by the voice of conscience-a voice both proximate and exterior
to me-that summons me to my obligations and responsibilities.
What does Ricoeur mean by the term conscience? Conscience. Ricoeur
writes, is
the voice . . . addressed to me from the depths of myself ... the fomm of
the colloquy of the self with itself. . . . We need. I think. to preserve within
the metaphor of the voice the idea of a unique passivity, both internal and
superior to me . ... In this sense, conscience is nothing other than the attestation by which a self affects itself. . .. The point is that human being has
no mastery over the inner. intimate certitude of existing as a self; this is
something that comes to us. that comes upon us, like a gift, a grace. that is
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not at our disposal. This non-mastery of a voice that is more heard than ,poken leaves intact the question of its origin .... The strangeness of the mire
(of consciencel is no less than that of the flesh or that nf other human
beings.-

In the depths of one's interiority, the subject is enjoined to live W('ll wi th oneself and for others. The colloquy of the self with itself- the phenomenon of
being enjoined-occurs in the place where the self appropriates for itsel f the
demand of the other upon it. Conscience, then. is the forum for the summoning of the self to its obligations.
As I noted above, while Ricoeur scrupulously avoids grounding the disciplines of religious studies and philosophy upon one another. he does not
object to borrowing concepts from one domain in order to illuminate problems within the discourse of the other field of inquiry. The upshot of this
careful give-and-take interchange is the recognition, by Ricoeur, of certain
deep affinities or homologies that exist between key terms that intersect the
two disciplines. His analysis of the phenomenon of conscience is emblematic
of this homologous approach to understanding the human condition. In his
philosophical writing, Ricoeur is self-consciously agnostic about the origins
of conscience, the experience of being enjoined by the other: "Perhaps the
philosopher as philosopher has to admit that one does not know and cannot
say whether ... the source of the injunction, is another person ... or my
ancestors ... or God- living God, absent God-or an empty place. With this
aporia ... philosophical discourse comes to an end."~
But in one of the two theological papers that Ricoeur excised from the
original set of Gifford Lectures that constitute Oneself as Another. Ricoeur
does identify the origins of conscience in the voice of God-a voice that
enjoins the hearer to care for oneself and attend to the needs of others. In his
omitted lecture on the summoned self, Ricoeur identifies conscience as the
inner chamber where the divine mandate is heard and understood. In the interior voice of obligation, each person is called by God to exercise responsibility for oneself and the other. Indeed, conscience is now valorized as the
inalienable contact point between the Word of God and human beings: it is
the forum where divine forgiveness. care for oneself, and solicitude for others intersect. "Conscience is thus the anthropological presupposition without
which 'justification by faith· would remain an event marked by radical
extrinsicness. In this sense, conscience becomes the organ of the reception of
the Kerygma. in a perspective that remains profoundly Pauline."'1 Without
conscience. the divine voice that summons the self to its responsibilities falls
on deaf ears. In Ricoeur's earlier writings, the pmd11cti1·e imagination's
capacity to interpret symbolic language played the role of a sort ofpraeparatio evangelica for the reception of the divine word. 10 While not denying this
previous emphasis. the focus is now on the subject's moral capacity for an
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internal dialogue with itself that makes possible the hearing and understanding of God's voice in the life of the listening subject.
Ricoeur's analysis of conscience reflects the lifelong impact of Levinas
on his thought, both religious and philosophical. As does Levinas, Ricoeur, in
his theological writings on conscience, argues that the biblical scriptures consistently press onto the reader the obligation to appropriate God's demand-a
demand definitive ly represented by the biblical prophets- to take responsibility for the welfare of the other. Along with Levinas, Ricoeur maintains that
the ideal of the morally commissioned self is central to the biblical texts. In
particular. the establishment of the prophetic /. through heeding the call of
obligation for the other, is an underlying theme throughout these texts. In
exegeting the Abrahamic/Mosaic response "here I am," Ricoeur writes, "I
see, for my part, in this figure of a ·summoned subject' a paradigm that the
Christian community, following the Jewish community, could make use of to
interpret itself." 11 Ricoeur's position regarding the prophetic subject is analogous to that of Levinas, who writes that "religious discourse that precedes all
religious discourse is not dialogue. It is the 'here I am· said to a neighbor to
whom I am given over, by which I announce peace, that is, my responsibility
for the other." 1!
In spite of this rough agreement, an important point of contention separates Ricoeur and Levinas in reference tu the questions of conscience and the
summoned self: whether the self is constituted solely by its obedience to the
cry of the other for justice, or whether the move to selfhood and the capacity
to respond tu the entreaty of the other are cooriginary. In other words, is the
self a product of the other's summoning it to its responsibilities, or is it not
the case that the presence of the self itself, in the depths of its own conscience, is the necessary condition for hearing and responding to the other's
attempt to awaken it to its responsibilities? For Levinas, I become a subject
through radical self-divestment, by becoming hostage to the other. "The
more I return to myself, the more I divest myself ... I am 'in myself through
the others.'' 1J I have no self- I am not an /-without the other awakening me
to my responsibility for the welfare of the other: "The word I means here I
am, answering for everything and for everyone.... I exist through the other
and for the other.'"~ Ricoeur contends, however. that Levinas's idea of the
passive self, singularly formed in response to unfulfillable obligation, undermines the dialectic between self and other, realized through the agency of
one's conscience. essential to moral action. Conscience, as we have seen, is
the site of intersection between selfhood and otherness, the place where my
ethical ownness "within" and the commanding voice of the other "without"
indwell one another. according to Ricoeur. 15 Only a self- as the subject and
object, in its conscience. of its own internal dialogue-can have an otherthan-self rouse it to its responsibility. Only a self- insofar as it esteems itself
as a self capable of reason, agency, and good will----can exercise solicitude
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for others. Ricoeur argues that self-identity is not merely a res11/r of nne·s
response to the call of the other: it is also what must be presupposed for the
call to be heard and understood in the first place. Pace Levinas. Ricocur asks.
"Would the self be a result [of its assignment to take responsihi lity for the
other] if ii were not first a presupposition. that is. potentially capahle of hearing this assignment? ... [l)s it forbidden 10 a reader, who is a friend
of ... Levinas, to puzzle over a philosophy where the attestation of the self
and the glory of the absolute !or: the care of the other! would be cooriginary?"11, Self-attestation-the capacity for self-esteem-has its origin in
my self-reflexive openness to being enjoined to give myself to meet the
other's needs even as my hearing and understanding the voice nf the other
have their origin in my regard for myself as a moral subject. Ricoeur stubbornly insists on preserving self-love and other-regard in a correlative tension that he argues is snapped by Levinas·s one-sided emphasis on
self-emptying obedience in the face of the summons of the other. 17

III
This disagreement over the question of the mandated self reflects the different hermeneutical orientations of both thinkers. In the mid- l 970s at a conference on the topic of "revelation," Levinas and Ricoeur engaged in a spirited
debate about the nature of revelation in Judaism and Christianity vis-a-vis the
question of biblical exegesis. In the proceedings from that meeting, Levinas
maintains that the gravitational center of the biblical texts is halakhic discourse: the commandments and their explication is the centripetal focus of
the scriptures. In his comments, after registering his appreciation for
Ricoeur's use of discourse analysis to explicate laxonomically the various
revelatory modalities within the Bible. Levinas raises an important caveat:
But perhaps, for a Jewish reading of the Bible. (Ricoeur's l distinctions cannot be established quite as finnl y as in the pellucid classification we have
been offered. Prescriptive lessons-found especially in the Pentateuch, the
part of the Torah known as the Torah of Moses-occupy a privileged position within Jewish consciousness. as far as the relationship with God is concerned. Every text is asked to produce such lessons: the psalms may allude
to characters and event. but they also refer to prescriptions . .. (andl the
texts of the Wisdom literature are prophetic and prescriptive. 18

Biblical revelation centers on prescriptive teachings-regarding matters of
behavior, morality. ritual, and law-to the degree that even in seemingly
unlegal genres, such as the Psalms and sapiential literature, Levinas argues
that there are prescriptive upheavals where God's commanding voice to the
reader breaks through the literary surface of these texts.
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Ricoeur sees matters very differently. His focus falls on how revelation
is generated- how God is "named"'- through the polyphony of diverse biblical genres. To he sure. Ricoeur's biblical discourse analysis is acutely aware
of the function of prescriptive discourse in summoning the self to its responsibilities. But Ricoeur makes this po int against the backdrop of a wider semiotic concern for reading the whole Bible as a point-counterpoint intenext. 19
Because attention to biblical genre diversity, according to Ricoeur, is necessary for a mult ifaceted understanding of the divine life. it follows that assigning privileged status to this or that panicular genre threatens to flatten out the
Bible's overall diversity and its regional zones of indeterminacy and discontinuity. Singular attention to any one discourse-incl uding legal discourseruns the risk of homogenizing the Bible's semantic polyphony. 'The naming
of God, in the originary expressions of faith. is not simple but multiple. It is
not a single tone, but polyphonic. The originary expressions of faith are complex forms of discourse ... [that] name God. But they <lo so in various
ways." 20 It is only as any one biblical genre is interanimate<l by its crossfertilizations with the medley of other modes of discourse that the biblical texts
effectively make meaning.
For Ricoeur. textual revelation is moderated by the play of literary genres. In the case of the Bible, the Bible's different modes of significationnarratives, hymns. wisdom sayings, laws, poems, gospels, apocalyptic
writings, and so forth-generate a surplus of meaning outside the control of
any one genre or particular theme. These various fonns of aniculation are not
simply taxonomic devices for categorizing discourse but rather the means by
which theological meaning is produced. "The literary genres of the Bible do
not constitute a rhetorical facade which it would be possible to pull down in
order to reveal some thought content that is indifferent to its literary vehicle."21The Bible's different registers of discourse are more than just classificatory codes or decorative literary trappings because the content of religious
discourse is generated and determined by the literary forms employed to
mediate particular theological understandings.
Ricoeur's discourse analysis of the Bible seeks to show how the stories
and sayings of the Bible are not one-dimensional exercises in coherence but
rather multivalent points of intersection for a variety of discourses and their
contrasting theological itineraries. From this perspective, the scriptural figuration of the divine life- the phenomenon of revelation-is radically problematized by attention to the mixed genres employed by the biblical writers.
"Throughout these discourses, God appears differently each time: sometimes
as the hero of the saving act, sometimes as wrathful and compassionate,
sometimes as he to whom one can speak in a relation of an I-Thou type, or
sometimes as he whom I meet only in a cosmic order that ignores me:·~~ In
this approach, the Bible emerges as a heterogeneous intenext of oppositional
genres-genres that alternately complement and clash with one another-
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rather than a stable book unified by a particular discourse. including prescriptive discourse (pace Levinas).
Nevertheless. in spite of these important differences that separate
Ricoeur and Levinas from one another on the questions of selfhood. ethics,
and hermeneutics, I believe that Ricoeur, on a level that reflects his profound
admiration of Levinas's philosophy, would. in one sense, have a deep sympathy for Levinas's biblical henneneutic. Levinas is clear that as a positioned
Jewish reader of the Bible, his goal is faithfully to recover the dynamically
open invitation to obedience at the heart of the Bible-an invitation that is
central to Jewish unity, and has been essential to its preservation, throughout
the generations. "From the outset Jewish revelation is one of commandment,
and piety lies in obedience to it." 1.1 For Ricoeur, insofar as biblical meaning is
never frozen "in" the text, but made in the encounter " between·· text and
reader, then a Christian hermeneutic, understandably, has the right to subsume legal discourse to a wider concern for the panoply uf other, nonlegal
discourses that generate the surplus of meanings within the biblical texts. The
hermeneutical difference between both thinkers is significant and to some
degree irreconcilable but, nevertheless, productively illustrative of the
equally principled religious locations-Jewish and Christian, respectivelyfrom which both philosophers assay the meaning of being summoned by the
other to meet our obligations for his or her welfare.

IV
Let me conclude with some comments regarding Ricoeur's notion of the
summoned self in the spirit of an immanent critique. I say ''immanent critique" because I want these final comments to stand alongside the broad
assumptions of Ricoeur's project while still questioning some aspects of his
construal of the notion of conscience. Jn this essay, J have sought to show
how Ricoeur-in contrast, and in faithfulness, tu Levinas-persuasively
deploys a notion of conscience as a power of inward deliberation that mediates self-esteem and solicitude for the other. In this respect, Ricoeur·s discussion of conscience has a distinctly Aristotelian cast: analogous to Aristotle's
analysis of virtue, Ricoeur's understands conscience as the self's capacity for
inward adjudication between extremes. Conscience is an exercise in prudential, reflective equilibrium. It is the colloquy of the self with itself where
one's interior capacity for practical wisdom- phronesis-thoughtfully
guides action directed to the care of self and other.
But what I find missing in Ricoeur's magisterial analysis of conscience is
an equally powerful account of the phenomenon of the war of the self with
itself in the interior adjudication of opposing life choices and moral options. In
the colloquy of the self with itself, the character of this interior conversation is
oftentimes more like an aporetic and conflicted contest between diverging
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voices than it is a careful and deliberative weighing of adjudicable options.
Caught in the vicegrip of seemingly irresolvable extremes for action, the self,
as it struggles with the voice of conscience within. must often run the risk of
dissolving into an irredeemable jumble of broken pieces in its agonistic struggle to decide which path to pursue in responsibility to itself and others. Conscience, in this model, is not a hearkening to a voice or the voice within. but a
confrontation with a plurality of many differem voices-some of which are
self-generated. others of which have their origin outside of the self. Conscience, from this perspective, is not a hearkening to one voice-be it the voice
of the other or the voice of God or the voice of the nowhere-but a
cacophonous echo chamber of many voices-many disparate and irreconcilably
contested voices-all of which lay claim to the attention of the moral agent.
Ricoeur's recent work does make a partial tum to analyzing the role of
irresolvable ethical conflict within the conscience of the moral subject. Nodding to Greek theater, he writes in the final essay of The Just about the "tragic
dimension of action," where "strong evaluations relating to heterogeneous and
sometimes competing goods" come into opposition with one another.~4 Moral
conflict stems from the irreducible diversity of substantial goods. All of these
goods cannot be brought together to form a larger synthesis in this or that particular situation of ethical decision-making. The results of such decisionmaking are tragic because there is no universal maxim that can adjudicate
which goods are to be preserved and which are to be deemphasized or sacrificed altogether. For certain decisions, there is no formal rule-such as Kant's
categorical imperative-that can mediate between contesting notions of the
good. Such decisions are tragic rather than heroic: they often result in murky
mediatorial positions that preserve the lesser of two evils rather than the elevation of a higher good over and against a transparent evil. "Wisdom in judging
consists in elaborating fragile compromises where it is a matter less of deciding
between good and evil, between black and white, than between gray and gray,
or, in the highly tragic case, between bad and worse."2~ When incompatible
goods or nom1s enter into conflict, practical moral wisdom consists of muddy
compromises played out in the darker registers of human action.
Ricoeur's analysis of intractable moral disagreements is subtle and incisive. Nevertheless, he eases the tensions inherent within tragic decisionmaking through an appeal to group process in moral judgments. Within one's
individual conscience the antinomies created by weighing different moral
options appear to be hopelessly at odds with each other. But now conscience-the inner forum of self speaking to self-has a larger set of conversation partners to appeal to about the right course of action to pursue.
[Tlhe decision taken at the end of a debate with oneself, at the heart of what
we may call our innermost forom, our heart of hearts. will be all the more
worthy of being called wise if it issues from a council. o n the model of o ur
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French national consultative council on ethics. or on the model of the: small
circle bringing together relatives. doctors. psychologists. an<l rcligiou~
leaders at the bed of someone who is dy ing. Wisdom in judging and 1hc: pronouncement of wise judgment must always involve more than one person.
Then conscience truly merits the name ,om·icrimr.:,,

Practical wisdom consists of moving outside of oneself toward a larger body
of decision-makers-a relevant governmental body. for example. or the inner
circle of one's immediate family- that can provide a wider reflective context
for moral judgment. Indeed. such judgment is not truly moral. Ricoeur avers,
unless it '"always involves more than one person." Without a plurality of
voices to attend to, moral judgment runs the risk of devolving into solipsism.
No important moral decision should be taken alone- rather. one's conscience must always seek counsel with a larger se11.1·11s com1111111is as a check
and balance against one's own individual discernment about the application
of the good (or goods) in particular circumstances.
Ricoeur's theory of conscience makes clear the role a wider social dialogue can play in forming good judgment. But the problem with his social
model of conscience is that it appears unable to account for those acts of
inner moral conviction that question the integrity of the wider circle said to
be essential to moral judgment. If practical decisions are not truly "wise"
apart from social mediation, then what role. if any, can an individual's distinctive moral certainties play in calling that individual to perform actions
that undermine the beliefs and values of his or her cultural milieu') The problem with Ricoeur's social model of moral judgment is a certain tone-deafness
to the importance of alteriry in the formation of sound judgment. If conscience is ultimately subsumable to the larger social group. is there any place
for the sometimes unique and distinctively "other" voice of "the good
within" to question, even tear apart the fabric of one· s social relations in an
effort to work out the meaning and truth of one's ownmost, radically individualistic, and oftentimes antisocial sense of the wwd? ls not conscience often
the voice of a profound sense of social unrelatedness-of the totaliter
alirer-that allows persons to press beyond the limited confines and orthodoxies of their communal groups in order to realize new expressions of truth
and goodness? Ricoeur's consistent emphasis on the relational context for
moral judgment seems unable to account for the visionary excesses of the
distinctive individual whose ethical praxis appears independent from. and a
comprehensive challenge to. her lived surroundings.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer's life and work gives evidence of the irresolvable
dilemmas that plague conscience-<lilemmas that are nut easily resolvable
by appealing to a wider semu.1· comnumis. It is well known that Bonhoeffer·s
active resistance to the Nazis--culrninating in his participation in the conspiracy to assassinate Hitler in 1944-eventually led to his execution in the

The Summoned Self

91

Flossenbiirg concentration camp in 1945. However. Bonhoeffer·s book
Ethics, written prior to and during the time he was vigorously working to
subvert the Reic h government in the early 1940s, paradoxically lifts high the
ideal of loyalty to the state. The irony here is that precisely at the time in
which Bonhoeffer is plotting to overthrow the rule of the National Socialists
in Germany. he is also imploring the readers of his Ethic.I' to remember that
the claim of government is from God and binding on conscience; that proper
deference to the governing authorities is the proper rule for citizens of the
state; that even when the government makes war against the church. the
Christian should avoid any "apocalyptic diabolization of government"; and
that while concrete acts of disobedience to government are occasionally licit.
no regular and systemic disobedience of government is permissible, no matter how anti-democratic and anti-God the ruling powers have become. 27
The ironic conflict that punctuates the division between Bonhoeffer·s
theological apologetic for government and his seditious activities to overthrow government elucidates the internal battle of opposing viewpoints
within conscience. Bonhoeffer was well aware of this interior contest. He
writes that in order to listen to and heed one's conscience- under the tutelage
of the Gospel message- it is sometimes necessary to "bear guilt for the sake
of charity." 2x In fidelity to conscience, one may find oneself running the risk
of incurring guilt in pursuit of the responsible action in service to the neighbor. At times, one must do the wrong thing in order to pursue a higher good.
Given his theology of the divine right of government. Bonhoeffer himselfin living out the dictates of his conscience to join the conspiracy to kill
Hitler-also. fundamentally, trampled upon his conscience by assuming the
guilt of murder through disobeying the commandment of the decalogue,
'"Thou shalt not kill." Of course, that Bonhoeffer was a pacifist-or, perhaps,
a conditional pacifist-is a fact that only further complicates this aporetic
division between his life and his writing. In taking the risk to become a killer,
Bonhoeffer violated both his inner conscience and stepped outside the wider
circle of received Christian opinion about the sanctity of human life.
Using Bonhoeffer, my criticism of Ricoeur here focuses on his relative
lack of attention to the unassimilable welter of voices that make claims on
the inner authority of conscience. My suggestion is that conscience, in many
instances. is not a royal road to reflective judgment. a still point in the turning
world of moral action. but a contested site of deep turmoil where the antinomic character of ethical decision-making is most keenly felt. As well. appeals
to a wider se11.rns rnmm1111is oftentimes does not help to mediate the plurality
of contesting goods, but further exacerbates this conflict. This criticism is not
to deny that Ricocur is acutely aware. especially in his earlier work , of the
tensive disproportionality of the self with itself in its incapacity to mediate
the consciousness of freedom and brokenness of unfulfilled desire. But it
remains unclear to me why Ricoeur does not thematize the phenomenon of
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conscience with the same awareness of the ineliminahle oppositions that
.ifflict the inner life that defined his earlier poetics of the will.
Is the internal conversation of the self with itself a leve l-headed process hy
which o pposing o ptions are weighed in the halance and a rational decision is
then made in a deliberative fashion? In the interior debate with oneself can one
adjudicate conflicts through rational appeals to a wider circle of dccisionmakers? Or is this inner colloquy less a dialogue between friends and more a
disputation between combatants where the type of agonistic ethical dilemmas
faced by Bonhoeffer are ultimately unfathomable and unresolvable'.' At times.
Ricoeur's moderating appeal to the voice of conscience-whatever the ultimate
origins of this voice-appears too sanguine about the interior capacity of the
human subject to arbitrate between moral extremes in a fair and even-handed
manner. With regard to the ultimate questions of the moral life- the life and
death issues faced hy Abraham at Mount Moriah or Bonhoe ffer in war-ravaged
Germany- these questions appear less like candidates for an inner colloquy
and more like disputants in an ongoing struggle over irreconcilable ideals and
choices. Ricoeur·s philosophy of the summoned self-a self enjoined through
the medium of conscience- can be broadened hy a deeper appreciation of the
abyssal chaos that lies at the center of all matters of the heart.
This caveat notwithstanding, I have sought to show how Ricoeur' s Levinasian recovery of the biblical ideal of self-giving can be a trnn sformative
paradigm for integrated s ubjectivity in and with the other person. In
Ricoeur's thought one can better comprehend the- power and mystery of
Jesus· ironic claim that unless one loses oneself o ne cannot find oneself.
Unless one forfeits oneself one camwr discover ge1111ine sc(flwod. The task of
becoming a full self is most adequately performed by allowing oneself to be
appropriated by the ethical possibilities projected by the biblical texts. In this
gesture, a person's spiritual practice becomes her destiny as a moral subject:
by taking the risk of becoming assimilated into the strange universe of the
biblical texts, o ne makes good o n the wager that a scripturall y refigured self
is the crown of a life well lived.
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